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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

DOROTHY STEVENSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No.

9529

VERNON L. STEVE.NSON,
Defendant .a'nd Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ST·ATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a suit for divorce on the grounds of mental
cruelty, and for alimony, and for distribution of the
marital estate.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER C01'RT
The trial court found that plaintiff had failed to
prove n1ental cruelty and denied her a divorce.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order of this court reversing the
judg1nent of the trial court, and ordering the trial court
to enter a decree of divorce in her favor, and to u1ake
an equitable distribution of the property of the parties
and to grant her such alimony as is fair and reasonable
under the circumstances.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this brief we shall refer to the parties as they
appeared in the court below. Since this case is equitable
in nature, and the facts should be reviewed by the Court,
we set forth the evidence in some detail.
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment of the
District Court denying her relief in her suit against
defendant for divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty.
In this brief we shall refer to the parties as they appeared in the court below. Since this case is equitable in
nature, and the facts should be reviewed by the Court,
we set forth the evidence in some detail.
The testimony of the plaintiff on her case in chief,
may he smnmarized as follows:
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Plaintiff and defendant were rnarried at Newport,
Washington, on January 11, 1935. (R. 25). Two children,
both of whon1 had reached adulthood at the time of trial,
were born as issue of the n1arriage. (R. 26). From the
very inception of the 1narriage there were difficulties.
On the second night of their marriage, defendant asked
plaintiff for a divorce, and she slept on the couch that
night. (R. 27). He told her that she was not a lady.
From that time he repeatedly thereafter, throughout the
course of their marriage, suggested divorce. (R. 27).
Over the course of their married life, defendant required plaintiff to perform all types of menial services
for him, notwithstanding that he was an eminently successful physician with a good income. For example, the
plaintiff had the responsibility of reaming out and
cleaning his pipe. (R. 35). When they went on trips she
was required to pack his suitcase and have it ready at
the door. (R. 35). She was required to take his clothes
to the cleaner, maintain the garden, and maintain the
plumbing. (R. 35). She was required to handle all of
the telephone calls, including calls at all hours of the
night, although the telephone was on defendant's side
of the bed. (R. 36-37). When it was necessary for the
defendant to get up in the night to go on calls, he required her to get out of bed, move her car out of the
driveway and open the garage door so that he could
drive his car out. (R. 37). Throughout their marriage,
he compared her unfavorably to other women. (R. 37).
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At one time during their rnarried life when plaintiff
was suffering fr01n a herniated intervertebral disc, he
required her to perform all of her household duties in
the usual manner. She was at this tirne in such pain that
she had to push a chair around to get around the house.
(R. 38). This was corroborated by her daughter, Marjorie, who also testified that her mother had no rnedication for relief of pain. (R. 224, 226).
She was required to perforn1 complete valet service
for hin1, including the drawing of his baths, even at 4:30
in the morning. (R. 38). She was also required to go
downstairs to get him drinks of water at night. (R. 38).
At one tirne when they were moving to a new home,
defendant sat in a white shirt and tie and watched plaintiff perform all of the work without stirring a muscle to
assist her. (R. 39).
Plaintiff had c01nplete responsibility for the maintenance of the yard and the swimming pooL (R. 40).
She also had ahnost cornplete responsibility for the
rearing, education and religious training of the children.
Defendant's only contribution to their education was
paying for it. Their 24-year-old son had never been baptized in any church and defendant never went to church,
nor did he ever take the children to church. He forbade
her to take the children to the church of her choice. (R.
42-43).
Defendant required plaintiff to bring his lunch to
hirn at the office three or four tiines a week even though it
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necessitated her leaving bridge luncheons or other social
engagernents. (R. -±±). On one occasion, he required her
to leave a swinuning party at her home, at which she
was the hostess, to conre down to his office and adjust
the lawnmower. (R. 45).
The rnarital problerns becanre acute about January
of 1959, following a dinner party, at which they had a
spat. He again told her to seek a divorce, and she deterurined to do so. He then said "Dorothy, I am sorry, I
didn't realize you were paranoid." (R. 28). At this time
she moved out of his bedro.om and the parties never
thereafter shared the same sleeping quarters. (R. 30).
From January through J nne the situation was very
tense and unpleasant. There were numerous talks about
their family problems, in all of which, the doctor laid the
entire blame on her, telling her it was her fault and that
she should take stock. He admitted no faults whatsoever. (R. 29). He also blamed the difficulties onto both
her mental and physical condition. (R. 30). At v:arious
times he stated that she was paranoid, and he told Dr.
Branch that his wife was going through the change and
that she was responsible for all of their difficulties, and
he was not. (R. 29-30, 62)
In May or J nne of that year, plaintiff consulted
legal counsel for the first time. In June she determined
to leave the home, leaving a note under his pillow. (R.
31). She went to Claremont, California, where her
daughter was going to school. Her husband and son
followed her immediately and persuaded her to come
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hmne. At this time the defendant admitted that he was
at fault in the marriage, and he agreed to change his
ways if she would come horne, and try to work things
out. He agreed to be nwre generous with her in financial
matters, and to provide her with better clothes. He
agreed to go to church with her on Sunday, and to come
home for dinner at a specified time. She remained in
the family horne fron1 June through September, attempting to work matters out, and it didn't work out. Defendant refused to perform any of his agreements, and not
only did not come horne for dinner as agreed, but complained at the quality of the meals (which had been on
the stove for three or four hours) when he finally did
come home. (R.32-33).
Whenever plaintiff made any complaints to defendant, his reply was "you were the one that left.'' Plaintiff becmne extre1nely bitter, and for the first time got
to the fish-wife level. There were n1any bitter arguments
during this period. Defendant again refused to accept
any responsibility for the n1arital difficulty. (R. 33).
Whenever plaintiff Inade complaints he charged her with
being paranoid. (R. 62). Plaintiff suggested marriage
counselling, but defendant refused to go. Plaintiff finally
went to see Dr. C. Hardin Branch, to see if there wasany
truth to defendant's repeated assertions of paranoia.
She consulted with Bishop Watson of the Episcopal
Church, both individually and with 1nembers of the
family group. (R. 3-±). Finally plaintiff permanently
removed from the home in Septmnher. (R. 35). At
about this time defendant threatened suicide (R. 48).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
AI though plain tiff could not bear to ren1ain longer
in the family hOine, she did not innnediately seek a divorce. She yielded to the importuning of her husband
and son, and agreed to a series of consultations with
Dr. Brown, a psychologist and marriage counsellor. She
had 22 hours of counselling over a six month period,
tenninating in July of 1960. (R. 48-49). Defendant also
received counselling during this period of time, but
nothing concrete was acemnplished toward salvaging the
1narriage. At one point when plaintiff was about ready
to return to the home, and did go back for an evening to
attend a party celebrating the engagement of her son,
her husband delivered to her an ultimatum, either to get
a divorce or nwve back. (R. 49). This was the last
straw, and in June of 1960, she finally filed for divorce.
(R. 1-3). In October of 1960, he told her that he "hated"
her (R. 47), and that any feeling he ever had for her
was dead. He also told her at this time that his family
considered her to be "low". (R. 48).
During the interim between the filing of the divorce
and the time of trial, defendant continued to lay all of
the blame at her doorstep, and to charge her with paranoia and other 1nental disorders. On her own initiative,
she sought further analysis from Dr. Branch and at this
time she also saw Dr. Ija Korner, a psychologist. (R.
54).
The case first came on for pretrial before Judge
Jeppson in December of 1960. No stenographic notes
were kept of the pretrial proceedings, but it is apparent
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from the letter of Dr. Branch to Judge Jeppson, which
appears in the record at page 6, that Dr. Stevenson was
still contending that his wife was n1entally unstable and
that this was the root of the rnarital difficulty. Dr.
Branch's letter also clearly indicates that there was no
evidence whatsoever to indicate that Mrs. Stevenson was
mentally ill or that she was reacting inappropriately to
her present situation. (R. 6). Judge Jeppson subsequently disqualified himself from further hearing the
case, and it came on for pretrial before Judge Van Cott
in January, 1961. (R. 7). Defendant persisted in his
claim that plaintiff was in need of psychiatric care and
persuaded the court to order both parties to submit themselves to a further series of psychiatric or psychological
consultations by psychiatrists or psychologists, to be
mutually selected by counsel. (R. 7). In response to
this order, plaintiff underwent a series of consultations
with Dr. Craig Nelson, psychiatrist. (R. 54). After the
completion of this consultation, Dr. Nelson also drew
the opinion that plaintiff was entirely mentally sound;
that her decision to seek a divorce was rational and
appropriate; that the granting of a divorce would be
beneficial to her rnental health, and that a denial of a
divorce would have an adverse effect. (Ex. P-3).
Plaintiff's separation fron1 her husband had a beneficial effect on her health. She gained 20 pounds from
the time of separation to the tilne of trial. (R. 50). In
view of all of the foregoing, plaintiff was of the opinion
at trial, that reconciliation or resun1ption of the rnarital
relationship was utterly impossible. (R. 55).
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Plaintiff also called in support of her case Dr.
William Brown, a clinical psychologist, who had been
active in the clinical psychology field since 1934. In
1950 he acquired a Ph.D degree in that field, and from
1950 to 1959 he was clinical psychologist and instructor
at the University of Utah in the departrnent of psychiatry. He was characterized by Dr. Ija N. Korner, Ph.D,
as one of the ''most competent" people in the western
states, (R. 181), and his qualifications were also endorsed by Dr. Nelson, M.D. (R. 202). At the request of
Dr. N. F. Hicken, a mutual friend of the parties, Dr.
Brown agreed to consult with them in an .effort to assist
them in their marital difficulties. (R. 79-80).
It was understood at the outset that he would consult with both parties for the purpose of helping them
both better to understand themselves, and if possible,
bring about a rnarital reconciliation. The ultimate goal
of the consultations was a reconciliation. (R. 80).
Dr. Brown saw the plaintiff on 14 separate occasions
for a total consultation period of 24 hours, over a period
of six months, commencing January 5, 1960. Initially
the plaintiff was very tense. (R. 81). However, as the
consultations proceeded, plaintiff became more self
understanding and made progress. (R. 82). Although
the defendant was cooperative in keeping appointments,
it was more difficult for him to do some self looking and
understanding. Throughout the course of the consultations, plaintiff remained fast to the idea that she did not
want to rernain in the marriage situation. However,
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there were occasions "during this period of ti1ne, she
n1ight have entertained trying the 1uarriage again, but
felt she got no indication of a similar intent frmn Dr.
Stevenson." (R. 83).
Dr. Brown was of the opinion that defendant's high
pressure to rmnain Inarried was an obstacle in the way
of the whole relationship and defeated the very purposes
he was trying to accomplish. (R. 84).
Plaintiff cmnmunicated freely to Dr. Brown. He
found no evidence whatsoever during tlris series of consultations that plaintiff's decision was influenced by any
abnormal or emotional condition (R. 84). It was his
opinion that there was no possibility of a marital reconciliation. (R. 87).
In cross-examining Dr. Brown, defendant persisted
in the same attempts as he had throughout the course of
the pretrial and trial proceedings, to show that plaintiff
had a mental illness, which was the basis of the marital
difficulty. On voir dire examination, counsel for defendant, inferentially at least~ attempted to show that plaintiff had psychiatric problems which the witness was not
cmnpetent to analyze, or to express an opinion concerning. (R. 85-86).
A considerable portion of the cross-exrunination was
devoted to attempting to secure an admission from Dr.
Brown that plaintiff had smne mental illness, and that
he had expressed such a view to defendant and defen-
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dant's counsel on the occasion of a two-hour interview in
July of 1960. However, the witness steadfastly maintained that plaintiff did not need further treatment. (R.
88). With reference to the two-hour conference between
the witness and the defendant and his attorney, Dr.
Brown testified "the bulk of the two hours was [def,endant] trying to i1npress the point Mrs .. Stevenson was
sick. I resisted strongly." This testimony was substantially reiterated on redirect examination. (R. 95).
Throughout the interview Dr Brown contended that
plaintiff was not sick. (R. 96).
It was normal for her to have tensions due to the
stress of her marital difficulties. (R. 96). In Dr. Brown's
opinion plaintiff could have functioned adequately without the help of his consultations, but the consultations
did have a beneficial effect upon her in helping her to
relax from all her tension. (R. 97).
Dr. Stevenson was called as a witness for the plaintiff, principally on the issue of his earning capacity and
the estate which had been built up by the parties. (R.
99). Dr. Stevenson admitted that plaintiff had had the
full responsibility of the household and of the rearing of
the children. (R. 113). He likewise admitted that her
efforts had contributed equally with his own in building
up the estate.
Upon this evidence the plaintiff rested her case in
chief. (R. 115).
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The only witness to testify upon defendant's behalf
\\'a~ defendant hi1nself. Except for a few minor points,
defendant did not undertake to refute specifically the
testimony of the plaintiff. As to Inany 1natters of which
plaintiff con1plained, defendant testified rather disdainfully that he had no recollection of the1n. Alnong these
were a quarrel on the second night of their marriage,
(R. 118) ; the incident of requiring her to c01ne to the
clinic to repair a lawn Inower, (R. 124); her disc injury,
(R. 126); and probleins in connection with the cleaning
and maintenance of the swinnning pooL (R'. 134). Other
portions of her testi1nony he apparently atte1npted to
deny inferentially without Ineeting the issues squarely,
siinply by testifying in so1ne detail that the marriage
had been an entirely happy one, at least until about three
years prior to the ti1ne of trial. (R. 120 to 125). He did
ad1nit however, that on a trip to 1fazatlan, l\fexico,
about three years prior to the trial, he noted that plaintiff was antagonistic toward hi1n, and that their marriage
had been unsatsifactory since that tiine. (R. 126-7).
Although this unsatisfactory situation existed, he
claimed to have no notion that plaintiff conte1nplated
leaving him in June of 1959. (R. 128). Almost innnediately upon discovering her note, he and his son left for
Los Angeles by autonwbile, and plaintiff was persuaded
b~" the son to return ho1ne "and see what we can work
out." ( R. 129) . Ad1ni ttedly plain tiff's agree1nent to return to the ho1ne wa8 on that basis, that is, to see what
could be worked out. However, after her return h01ne,
difficulties in the 1narital relationship increased. Defen-
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dant repeatedly suggested, ·'Let's do son1ething about
it," but this Inet only with increased hostility. (R. 129).
Defendant admitted no fault whatsoever on his part
for the breakdown in the Inatrimonial relationship, except that he spent too 1nuch time in his profession and
not as 1nuch time as he should have with his family. (R.
135, 152, 156). Although admitting this fault with one
breath, in the next, he placed the 1najor responsibility
for the Inarital breakdown on plaintiff's mental and emotional state. In fact the real thrust of his defense was
that the matriuwnial situation broke down solely as a
result of her 111ental and e1notional problems. He expressed the view that she had involutional melancholia
of the :Menopause. (R. 130, 139). He wanted to get for
her "more adequate" psycho-therapy. (R. 131). During
the summer that she returned home, he made every effort
to get medical care for plaintiff. (R. 136). He thought
medical treatment would solve the divorce problem. (R.
141). He arrogantly took the view that in consulting with
Dr. Brown, his primary purpose was to aid Dr. Brown
and that any benefits to him were purely secondary. (R.
151). In other words, she alone needed the treatments
or consultations.
On cross-examination he admitted that he never went
to church with the plaintiff after the first year after
their return to Salt Lake, except services in connection
with his daughter's attendance at Rowland Hall School
for Girls. (R. 144). He admitted that he agreed to make
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concessions to plaintiff, and to confonn to her desires
upon her agreement to return to the rnatrimonial domicile from Los Angeles. However, when he was asked to
nmne the concessions he rnade, he persistently evaded
the questions. (R. 149-150). Apparently his only effort
was to offer to get rnedical help for her, again placing
the entire fault at plaintiff's feet and not doing anything
to correct his own faults. Perhaps his attitude is best
exernplified by the following excerpt fr·orn his testirnony:
"~Irs. Stevenson rnoved to another roorn, which depressed me, and I rnoved my car amd she never moved a
car in that interval which was ,my way of showing I
wanted to .do something in her behalf.n (Emphasis ours.)
(R. 150). In other "Words, although he had agreed to
change his habits upon her agreen1ent to return home,
the only concession which he actually rnade was that he
no longer required her to get up in the nriddle of the
night to move her car, so that he could drive out. This
was his way of showing that he wanted to do something
for her. This was his rnagnificent concession to herhis noble effort to salvage the n1arriage.
He admitted that he had n1ade a telephone call to
her in which he told her he had no feeling for her. (R.
158), and he admitted that he had threatened suicide. (R.
160). .He also adrnitted that he had told both the children
and other rnernbers of the fanrily, and tire Hickens, that
the plaintiff had an ernotional problem "that was more
than superficial."

(1~.

160). He also adrnitted writing an

undated note to plaintiff wherein he a<hnitted "not being
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a good husband." (Ex. P-1). tTpon this testimony defendant rested.
The plaintiff was recalled by the court and asked
by hiin what fault she would admit in the marital breakup. She answered candidly that she did not believe that
anyone was guiltless, and that she felt that her basic fault
was in yielding to all of the defendant's demands, and in
not insisting on a certain liberty for herself. The court
chose to interpret this as a claim by her that her only
fault was in not correcting defendant's faults. (R. 166).
Since the defendant based his defense largely upon
the claim that plaintiff was suffering from a mental and
emotional difficulty, which was the cause of the marital
difficulty, plaintiff called as rebuttal witnesses Dr. Ija
N. Korner and Dr. Craig Nelson, to testify as to plaintiff's complete rationality and good mental health. Dr.
Korner is a clinical psychologist, holding the chair of
Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Utah,
where he has been employed since 1949. He does clinical,
diagnostic, and therapeutic work. Plaintiff was referred
to him by Dr. C. Hardin Branch for evaluation in September of 1960. (R. 167-168).
The purpose of Dr. Korner's examination was to
determine whether plaintiff's desire for a divorce was
pathological or irrational. He saw the plaintiff three
_times. He detern1ined as a result of his tests and examinations that she was not mentally ill and was not neurotic.
She was upset, which was a normal and proper reaction
to the stress she was under. (R. 169).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
Dr. Craig Nelson, a practicing psychiatrist, was appointed by the court to exarnine plaintiff professionally
as a re·sult of the pretrial order requiring both parties
to subrnit to psychiatric or psychological consultations.
He had 12, fifty rninute interviews with plaintiff. It is in
accordance with the best psychiatric practice to lirnit
consultations to periods of not to exceed one hour per
day. (R. 192-19-±). Plaintiff cooperated with the doctor
completely. There was excellent con1rnunication both
ways. After the first interview he was satisfied that
there was no question of any serious mental illness. There
was no psychosis. Originally her fear of her husband was
excessive and somewhat unreasonable, but later became
dinrinished as she knew herself better. (R. 195).
He stated that in his opinion she was very healthy
enwtionally and mentally; there was no evidence of
any psychosis, and no evidence of any neurosis to the
degree of being disturbed. Any neurosis was within norrnal lin1its of behavior. Plaintiff benefited from her
series of consultations with him, which was, in itself, evidence of the good state of her mental health. (R. 196).
Dr. Nelson saw no evidence of any deep seated problern. He did not think the plaintiff needed any further
psycho-therapy. In his opinion, divorce would be beneficial to her. Her decision to seek a divorce was one well
thought out and considered at all levels. (R. 197). On
the other hand, denial or postponen1ent of a divorce
would place further stress on the plaintiff and intensify her sense of depression. (R. 198).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
B~· ero~H-exmnination,

eounsel for the defendant perRisted in his attmnpts to establish a Inental problem in
the plaintiff. 1-Iowever, Dr. Nelson insisted that the
anxiety which plaintiff had was appropriate to the situation in which she was. (R. 204). The 12 hours of consultation which she had was sufficient to enable her to
understand herself. (R. 205). Plaintiff did not have
involutional Inelancholia. (R. 207). Although counsel for
defendant sought to open up the subject of paranoia, the
court properly sustained objections to that line of inquiry (R. 210).
On redirect exan1ination, Dr. Nelson stated that
there were many elen1ents in plaintiff's decision to seek
a divorce, and that they were not neurotic. (R. 211).
Further counselling or psycho-therapy would not probably change plaintiff's attitude toward her husband or
her marriage. (R. 212). He reiterated that there was no
evidence of involutional melancholia in the plaintiff. (R.
217).
Plaintiff also called as a rebuttal witness her
daughter Marjorie, age 20 (R. 219). She testified that
she had first noticed difficulty between her parents when
she was about 10 years of age. (R. 219). She noticed
that her mother becan1e increasingly more tense, as did
the witness. A general feeling of tension continued to
build up over the years. (R. 220). Defendant told the
witness that her mother had a mental problem. (R. 221).
He also told her that her mother was sick and that the
questions propounded by her counsel on defendant's de-
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position were ''depraved." (R. 223). She also corroborated her mother's testimony as to the difficulty she had
had with her hack, and that she had to walk with the aid
of a chair, and that defendant refused to give her any
assistance at that time. (R. 224, 226). She characterized
her father's repeated demands for psychiatric and psychological consultations for her mother as being ''badgered." (R. 2.29).
With respect to her own relationship with defendant,
she stated that he refused to help her with her personal
problems, or to talk over problems with her. (R. 230-31).
Plaintiff was also recalled as a rebuttal witness. She
testified that she was at the time of trial still having regular menstrual periods. (R. 233). She went to Dr.
Branch and requested a complete mental evaluation. (R.
2·34). This was her own idea and not that of her counsel,
which she undertook to be prepared to meet the repeated
assertions of her husband that she was mentally or
emotionally disturbed. (Record page unnumbered; Reporter's T'ranscript p. 219). Plaintiff testified to other
events in their married life which had caused her distress, refuting defendant's testin1ony that everything was
"rosy'' until two or three years prior to the divorce
hearing.

.A few months after their marriage, defendant was
hospitalized for an appendectomy. During the course of
his confine1nent he developed a urinary infection, as a
result of which he accused his wife of infidelity, and
giving him a venereal infection. They took a delayed
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wedding trip, but did not live together because of his
infection. It ·was subsequently determined that the infection was not a venereal disease at all. (R. 235). However, defendant never so rnuch as apologized to her for
his false accusation. (R. 236).
Plaintiff also testified that the physical relationship
of the parties had been wholly unsatisfactory during
their entire rnarriage. Defendant blarned this on her, as
· being unresponsive. He said that her attitude could lead
to infidelity or divorce. At that time, she felt that she
was at fault, and because of that she was willing to perform all of the rnenial services he demanded of her, in
order to rnake up for her lack in the physical sphere of
their rnarriage. Not until she had her consultations with
Dr. Nelson did she finally realize that it was not her
fault. (R. 216). The sexual act was physically painful
to her. This was because defendant made no "build-up."
(R 237).
On one occasion in their early married years, defendant physically kicked the· plaintiff out of bed. On
another occasion, he left her alone in the woods on a
dark night while driving her home from a party. (R.
237-238).
Plaintiff consulted with an attorney in April or
May of 19'59. During that sumrner she consulted with
Bishop Watson of the Episcopal Church, her religious
adviser. She consulted with Dr. Brown from January
through June of 1960. These consultations all took place
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prior to the time that her divorce action was filed. (R.
238).
Defendant was recalled as a sur-rebuttal witness,
and he denied the testimony of plaintiff as to the specific
acts in their early married life of which she testified in
her rebuttal testimony. On this evidence both sides
rested.
In summary, the evidence shows without serious dispute, that whatever the situation was in the early years
of marriage, the matrimonial relationship had deteriorated to a point of mutual hostility and antagonism at
least two or three years before the time of the di~orce
trial. There is no dispute that after this time the marriage was wholly unsatisfactory to both parties, and had
become completely intolerable to plaintiff. Defendant
testified that during this period of time plaintiff was depressed, melancholy and hostile. She testified that during this period of time, he repeatedly charged her with
being mentally or emotionally disturbed, and refused to
accept any of the blame for the difficulty in the Inarriage; and although promising to change his ways, refused to do so, or to satisfy her con1plaints. Feelings of
tension increased rapidly and in June of 1959 plaintiff
left the home not intending to return, because she could
no longer endure residing in the same home with defendant. However, she yielded to the persuasions of her
son and husband, and did return for another three
rnonths in an attempt to work out the marital problems,
but the situation only becarne worse. She finally left the
home in September of 1959.
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l~ven

when she left at that tirne she did not irnnlediately file for divoree. In fact she did not file until nearly
a year later. In the rneanwhile, she had the benefit of
religious, rnedical, psychological, rnarital, and legal
counselling. 1-ier decision to file for divorce certainly
·was not precipitate, and she had extensive counselling
before the action was filed.
It was approxirnately nine nwnths from the time
the action was filed, until the trial. During this period
of time she had further consultations with Dr. Branch
and Dr. I{orner, and a series of consultations with Dr.
Nelson. She was nervous, "run-down" and fearful while
living with her husband. She regained weight and mental tranquility while separated from him. Dr. Nelson
testified that her health would be benefited by a divorce
and would be jeopardized by the denial or postponement
of a divorce. All of the experts who were called, agreed
that further marital consultations were not indicated and
would not be beneficial.
Plaintiff contends that the evidence overwhelmingly
established mental cruelty on the part of defendant in
at least two lines of conduct :
1. That defendant persistently demanded of plaintiff a large measure of menial personal service. Although
he denied some of her testimony, he sinrply claimed to
have no recollection as to other portions, and as to still
other portions, he admitted the acts performed, but
claimed that pla1ntlff d1d thetn out of love and a:Hectlori
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for him. That Inay have been his interpretation, but it
clearly was not hers, and certainly after the last trip to
Mexico, he could not have been unaware of her attitude.
However, instead of attempting to change his ways he
persisted in essentially the same course of conduct, justifying it with the oft-repeated assertion that she was
mentally ill, and that the problem could be solved by
psychiatric consultation for her.
2. Defendant persisted in charging plaintiff with
various mental and emotional disturbances, with being
paranoid, and with having involutional melancholia,
through the last two or three years of their marriage.
It is possible that originally he might have in good faith
believed that there was an emotional or mental disorde.r.
However, after four entirely independent and well qualified experts, (two of whon1 plaintiff had no voice whatsoever, in selecting), examined plaintiff and found her to
be entirely mentally and emotionally sound, a claim of
good faith in reasserting such charges is not tenable. On
the contrary, the charges of mental and emotional instability are revealed for what they truly are, an attempt
by the defendant to avoid personal responsibility for his
own Inisconduct in the n1arriage, and throw the blame
on her.

STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE RELIED UPON
1. THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT #4 IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
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2. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, AND IS AGAINST LAW.

ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT #4 IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO THE
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

II. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CONTRARY TO THE
WEIGHT OF 'THE EVIDENCE, AND IS AGAINST LAW.

This being an action equitable in nature, the evidence
1nay and should be reviewed and weighed by this court.
Griaziano v. Gra.ziano) 7 U.2d 187, 321 P2d 931. We are
confident that such a review by this court, will satisfy it,
that the o;verwheln1ing weight of the evidence established,
at the very least, that during the last two or three years
of their marriage defendant engaged in a course of conduct which was extremely cruel to plaintiff, which had
an adverse effect both on her physical and 1nental health
to the extent that she could no longer endure to continue
the marital relationship; and which entitled her to a
divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. It may be pertinent to note here, that the term "rnental cruelty'' does
not lend itself to a comprehensive definition. Each case
must be examined on its own facts and a determination
made as to whether the particular course of conduct
proved amounts to mental cruelty. 17 Am. Jur. 285-6.
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It is true that the type of cruelty practiced by defendant upon the plaintiff was of a very subtle type. This,
however, did not make it any the less painful to the victirn. In fact cruelty of this type rnay wound rnore
severely than blows. It n1ay also be true that defendant
did not act rnaliciously, and that at least for a tirue, he
rnay have been insensitive to the effect his conduct \Yas
producing on his wife. This again, is imrnaterial, since
acts of cruelty are adjudged not by the intent of the
doer, but the effect they have upon the victirn. 17 .Arn.
Jur., Divorce and Separation, §47.
There was a time when the courts required physical
brutality in order to establish grounds for divorce on
the ground of cruelty. That view has long since becOine
passe'. The rnodern and enlightened view is discussed by
Keezer in Marriage and Divorce, in a ehapter devoted
to this particular subject. The fpllowing quotations are
relevant here :
At page 410, Sec. 335, the author quotes with approval from Dickinson v. Dickinson, 54 Ind. App. 53, 102
NE 389, as follows:
" ... the more rnodern and better eonsidered
cases hold that any unwarranted and unjustifiable
conduct on the part of either the husband or the
wife which causes the other spouse to endure suffer,ing and distress to such a degree as to wholly
destroy; p~ace of miJnd, arv.d) 'IYnOtke: li,fe with ;such·
,spouse unbearable, a~nd which completely destroys
the real purpose and objects of matrimony, con-
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~titute

;;uch treatrnent as will justify the granting
of a decree of divorce on the ground of extreme
eruelt:· although no physical acts of cruelty have
been inflicted. "I (Emphasis ours.)
At page 412, he says :
"By the weight of authority, physical injury
or the threat thereof is not essential. l\fental
cruelty, i1'bdiffer. ence, ill temper, scolding, neglect,
a contemptuous attitude and sirnilar conduct may
be sufficient. It is difficult if not in1possible to
lay down what amount of insults or of offensive
conduct on the part of the husband or wife apart
from acts of physical violence will amount to
cruelty." (Emphasis ours.)·
At page 415:
"The acts of cruelty are to be judged by the
effect produced without regard to the 1notives of
the guilty party. It is not necessary that the acts
of alleged cruelty shall be malicious. Inasmuch
as the effect of acts done is an important element
in the offense, the character of the parties, their
positions in society, their sensibilities and actual
physical relations to external stimuli, mental
1nakeup and the like are all a part of the facts and
circurnstances to be presented to the tribunal
passing on the ultimate question of cruelty. Acts
inflicted upon or treatment administered to certain individuals might, because of social standing
or peculiar mental makeup drive such persons to
actual insanity; yet the same acts or treatment
might be the cause of only hilarious amusement to
others .... It may also be that in a particular case
one line of conduct is not of itself sufficient as a
cause for divorce, yet numerous of such lines of
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conduct all taken together, may constitute legal
cruelty, and it is the duty of the court to consider
all these circumstances."
In See. 359, page 422, the smne author says:
''As to what constitutes treatment endangering health, there is a broader, modern doctrine
being established. Aside from the acts of personal
violence and bodily injury, there is a tendency to
hold that there may be such conduct on the part of
the defendant which, while it does not come under
those heads, from its general effect on the mental
and nervous temperament of the victim, produces
a consequent injury to the health and tends to
shorten life, and is therefore considered a species
of cruelty."
See also page 423 :
"In determining these cases there is also a
tendency to take into consideration the station in
life, habits, training and refinement of the parties,
and what might be. cruelty to a person of refin&ment would not be to one of grosser sensibilities.''
See also page 427, Sec. 363 :
"The tendency of the modern decisions, reflecting the advanced civilization of the present
age is to view marriage from a different standpoint than as a mere physical relation. It is now
more wisely regarded as a union affecting the
mental and spiritual lives of the parties· to it, a
relation intended to bring them the comfort and
felicities of home life, and between whmn, in order
to fulfill such design, there should exist n1utual
sentiments of love and respect. 'It was fonnerly
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thought that to constitute extrmne cruelty such
as would authorize the granting of a divorce,
physical violence is necessary; but the modern
and better considered cases have repudiated this
doctrine as taking too low and sensual a view of
the marriage relation, and it is now very generally
held that any runjustiNable C011Aduct on the part of
either the husband or \Vife, which so grieviously
wounds the feelings of the: other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other, as to seriously i1npair the health, constitutes extreme
cruelty.' " (Emphasis ours.)
At page 428, the author says :
"The degree of Inental suffering required to
be shown in these cases varies with the decisions
on the different forms of the statutes. It is generally well settled, though, that such mental suffering as will impair the health as a matter of
fact, if shown by the evidence in the particular
case as due to the cruelty of the defendant, will be
sufficient. 111 ental suffering may be, and often i·s,
far greater than physical, and the tendency of the
courts is to regard uncalled for torture,
naggimg and false accusations, where wantonly
inflicted, if .sufficient in degree to inju,re health or
endanger reason, as cruelty and a ground' for divorce. In ... Utah . it is direct cause f'or divorce, and in many of the states conduct making
life unbea.rable and causing great mental suffering is sufficient in itself. This cruelty may consist
in habitttal unkimdness of the defenodant spouse."
(Emphasis ours.)
The foregoing rules are recognized and restated in
substantially similar language in 17 Ain. J ur. pp. 285 et
. seq., Divorce and Separation,§§ 47, et seq.
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The court n1ay consider acts which occulTed after
separation as constituting sufficient cruelty as to justify
a divorce. 17 Am. J ur., Divorce and Separation, Sec.
55. False charges of insanity or Inental deficiency, considered in connection with other acts, justify a divorce
for cruelty. 17 Arn. J ur. 303, Divorce and Separation, Sec.
69.
Although the case of Hildebrand v. Hildebrand)
(Okla.), 137 P. 711, is wholly dissimilar on its facts, and
we do not claim it as persuasive authority here, the
following quotation fron1 that opinion is singularly
appropriate:
''Blows often wound less deeply than words,
and in this age of Christian civilization when the
wife is not as a beast of the field but instead the
queen of the hon1e she is entitled of right to the
husband's unfaltering love and respect and where
this is denied her, where there is sufficient evidence, to the protection of the courts. We find
little patience with the insistence of the once semibarbaric rule that afforded an avenue of escape
to the injured wife only where physical violence
was inflicted upon her."
The court's nor:mally assu1ne that the wife is nwre
sensitive than the husband, and therefore in cases based
on mental cruelty, less aggravated acts Inay ,,~en constitue cruelty to the wife than would have to be sho\\Tn if
the plaintiff was the husband. 17 Ant. Jur., Divorce and
Separation, Sec. 49.
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The decisions of this court are in full accord with
the authorities above cited and quoted. In the early case
of Doe v. Doe -±8 Utah 200, 158 P. 781, thjs court said:
"The adjudged cases show that courts, on the
ground of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much
less evidence than they do the husband. That
rests on sound principles for acts and conduct on
the part of a husband may well constitute cruelty
to the wife causing her great mental distress,
when sirnilar acts and conduct on her part may
not constitute cruelty to him, or cause him great
rnental distress."
The rnost recent pronouncements of this court fully
reflect the views of Keezer above quoted.
In Hendricks v. Hendricks) 123 Ut. 178, 257 P.2d
366, this court said:
"Frorn everything that appears in the instant case, no good pwrpose) e;ither social) moral)
ethical or legal could be served by refusing to
grant a divorce and settle the property rights of
the parties. It would be but a mockery of the
true concept of matrimony to thus purport to
compel the:se two people) clearly ill-suited and
maladjusted to each other to contimue to ret,ain
the legal relationship of husba;n,d and wife.
"In view of the fact that neither spouse is
accused of the commission of a felony, adultery or
any other heinous offense, hut the reciprocal
claims rest upon various acts and omissions
alleged to constitute cruelty to the other, the trial
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ministr,ation of justice by determining which
party was least at fault, grant~ng a ;divorce and
adjusting their rights, giving due consideration
to the applicable factors outlined in our recent
opinion of Jl!IcDonald v. McDonald." (Emphasis
ours.)
In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 U. 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977, this
court said:
"When it appeared that the purposes of matrimony had been destroyed to the extent that
further living together was intolerable, it was in
acco~dance with the court's duty and prerogative
to grant plaintiff a divorce. In doing so it is
desirable to avoid perpetuation of the difficultie3
that brought failure to the marriage. The object
to be desired is to minimize animosities and to
'let the dead past bury its dead' insofar as that
is possible. The court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic resources so that the
parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy
and useful basis." (Emphasis ours.)
In Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Ut. 2d 197, 321 P.2d 931,
this court said :
''We divine from the record that, as in most
cases, neither party is without fault, yet there
appears to be n1uch 1nore good in both of them
than the other seen1ed willing to credit. It is
quite probable that in this proceeding under our
'adversary systmn' which sometilnes in cases of
domestic strife lends itself 1nore to inflaming
passions than to pacifying them, considerable
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anin1us was engendered between the parties, and
perhaps their counsel, which tended to n1agnify
and distort the faults each imputed to the other
out of true perspective for the purpose of 'winning' the case, an objective that neither could
accomplish in reality because the real prize : the
harrnony and happiness that might have been
were forever lost.

* * *
"Tennination of the marriage being inevitable, the object to be desired was to fashion a
decree which would be just and equitable under
the circumstances and, insofar as possible, minimize the animosities which had developed; and to
provide the best possible basis for the parties
to reconstruct their lives in a happy and useful
manner, with primary concern for the welfare
of their child.''
In Curry v. Curry, 7 Ut.2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, apparently the last expression of this court on this subject, it
is said:
"There of course must be some objective
standards upon which to judge whether mental
cruelty is made out. But it must also be realized
that what constitutes cruelty to the extent of
causing great mental distress has considerable
subjective content because it depends somewhat
upon the sensibilities of the person complaining,
and also in a measure upon the justification, or
lack of it, for the conduct complained of.

"Being made to feel inferior is ,a galliJng experience, ,and when persistent, can cre.ate a veritable sea of misery. It is plainly evident that
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because of what the defendant pleases to assun1e
are his advantages in education and background
he gave the impression of arrogating to himself
superiority over the plaintiff and her family;
and that she and they are of •back woods' character.

"It seems to us but an illusion to suppose that
we could, by a ukase of this court, remO!Yhd the
p1artves back into a state. of reconciliation and
happimess. In reality that would only leave them
in a state of unhappiness ·and anxiety from wluich,
as .a practical matter, some other solution would
be sought anyway.
"The use of pressur·e .and coercion, either by
the defendant directly, or by giving him support
in doing so by ,allowing him t:o have his own way
completely in this proceeding, would not only be
highly questionable as a method of accomplishing the: purpose he desires, but in fact may well
oast the most definite impediment to reconciliation, or some other worthy solution to the problems of these parties, that could be .devised. Adult
personalities usually do not respond to any such
mandatory tactics. If there is any possibility of
re-est·ablishment of ,a wholesome family relationship, it could come only through the voluntary
desires of these parties a"YYAd not through external
pressures." (Emphasis ours.)
Both reason and authority support plaintiff's claim
to a divorce in this case . .At the time of trial the marital
situation had deteriorated to a point where to continue
to live as husband and wife would be a crude 1nockery
of what the marriage relationship is intended to be. The
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parties are adults, and are 1nature. The plaintiff's decision to seek a divorce was a reasoned one, and was
arrived at only after extensive professional consultation
at all levels and frmu all points of view. The children
of the parties have reached adulthood and do not require
the sarne parental protection, supervision and control
as do children of tender years. Both are fully aware of
the difficulties between the parents, and denial of divorce
can in no way protect their feelings. All considerations
of law, equity, justice and common sense, rnilitate in
favor of granting the plaintiff a divorce.
CONCLUSION
The judgment below should be reversed and the case
should be remanded with directions to enter a decree of
divorce and to n1ake an equitable division of the property
of the parties, and to award to plaintiff her court costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRIST'ENSEN
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for plaintiff
1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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